Package documentation is available at matchingMarkets.org and the vignette is available from the CRAN page. An application of the estimator in function `stabit`

is in Klein (2015).

Get started by installing the R software for statistical computing.

To get the latest *stable version* of the package from CRAN:

```
install.packages("matchingMarkets")
library(matchingMarkets)
```

Under Linux, the dependency package `gmp`

requires that you have GNU MP (> 4.1.4) installed: `$ sudo apt-get install libgmp-dev`

. See http://gmplib.org.

To get the most recent *development version* from GitHub:

```
install.packages("devtools")
devtools::install_github("thiloklein/matchingMarkets")
library(matchingMarkets)
```

or from R-Forge:

```
install.packages("matchingMarkets", repos="http://R-Forge.R-project.org")
library(matchingMarkets)
```

Java Note 1: If you get a Java error such as `JAVA_HOME cannot be determined from the Registry`

, this can be resolved by installing a Java version (i.e. 64-bit Java or 32-bit Java) that fits to the type of R version that you are using (i.e. 64-bit R or 32-bit R). This problem can easily effect Windows 7 users, since they might have installed a version of Java that is different than the version of R they are using. See this post and download the Java version from the Oracle website.

Java Note 2: If the installation of the dependent `rJava`

package fails with configuration failed for package ‘rJava’, this can be fixed in Linux by `$ sudo apt-get install r-cran-rjava`

.

The `matchingMarkets`

R package comes with two estimators:

`stabit`

: Implements a Bayes estimator that corrects for sample selection in matching markets when the selection process is a one-sided matching game (i.e. group formation).`stabit2`

: Implements the Bayes estimator for a two-sided matching game (i.e. the college admissions and stable marriage problems).

and algorithms that can be used to simulate matching data:

`hri`

: Constraint model for the hospital/residents problem. Finds*all*stable matchings in two-sided matching markets. Implemented for both the stable marriage problem (one-to-one matching) and the hospital/residents problem, also known as college admissions problem (many-to-one matching).`hri2`

: Roth-Peranson Algorithm for the hospital/residents problem with couples. Finds the resident-optimal stable matching (if one exists) in the two-sided matching market.`iaa`

: Immediate Acceptance Algorithm (a.k.a. Boston mechanism): First-preference-first algorithm used for school choice in many countries. And Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Algorithm.`sri`

: Constraint model for the stable roommates problem. Finds all stable matchings in the roommates problem (one-sided matching market).`plp`

: Partitioning Linear Programme. Finds the unique matching in the roommates problem (one-sided matching market) with transferable utility.`rsd`

: Random serial dictatorship mechanism.`ttc`

: Top-Trading-Cycles Algorithm. Finds efficient matchings in the housing market problem.`ttc2`

: Top-Trading-Cycles Algorithm for a two sided matching problem.`ttcc`

: Top-Trading-Cycles and Chains Algorithm for the kidney exchange problem.

Functions `hri`

and `sri`

are based on Patrick Prosser’s n-ary constraint encoding model. They allow for *incomplete preference lists* (some agents find certain agents unacceptable) and *unbalanced instances* (unequal number of agents on both sides).

- Download from CRAN at

https://cloud.r-project.org/package=matchingMarkets - Report a bug at

https://github.com/thiloklein/matchingMarkets/issues

- GPL (>= 2)

- Thilo Klein

Author, maintainer - All authors...