Reference

Package Gives an overview of the various functions used in the matchingMarkets package.
	matchingMarkets-package	An R package for the analysis of stable matchings.
Algorithms Documentation for the most common matching algorithms.
	hri()	All stable matchings in the hospital/residents problem with incomplete lists
	hri2()	Resident-optimal matching in the hospital/residents problem with couples
	ttc2()	Top-Trading-Cycles Algorithm for a two sided matching problem
	iaa()	Immediate Acceptance Algorithm (a.k.a. Boston mechanism) for two-sided matching markets
	stabchk()	Stability-Check
	sri()	All stable matchings in the stable roommates problem with incomplete lists
	plp()	Partitioning Linear Programme for the stable roommates problem
	rsd()	Random serial dictatorship mechanism
	ttc()	Top-Trading-Cycles Algorithm with existing tenants
	ttcc()	Top-Trading-Cycles and Chains Algorithm
Estimators Structural estimators for one- and two-sided matching markets.
	stabit()	Matching model and selection correction for group formation
	stabit2()	Matching model and selection correction for college admissions
	predict(<stabit2>)	Predict method for fitted matching models
	khb()	Karlson-Holm-Breen method for comparing probit coefficients
	mce()	MC Experiments
Data generation Functions to produce simulated data for one-sided and two-sided matching markets.
	stabsim()	Simulated data for group formation problem
	stabsim2()	Simulated data for college admissions problem
Datasets Description of three datasets for matching markets contained in the package.
	baac00	Townsend Thai Project BAAC Annual Resurvey, 2000
	klein15a	MCMC results in Klein (2015a)
	klein15b	Results of Monte Carlo Simulations in Klein (2015b)