Package

Gives an overview of the various functions used in the matchingMarkets package.

matchingMarkets-package

An R package for the analysis of stable matchings.

Algorithms

Documentation for the most common matching algorithms.

hri()

All stable matchings in the hospital/residents problem with incomplete lists

hri2()

Resident-optimal matching in the hospital/residents problem with couples

ttc2()

Top-Trading-Cycles Algorithm for a two sided matching problem

iaa()

Immediate Acceptance Algorithm (a.k.a. Boston mechanism) for two-sided matching markets

stabchk()

Stability-Check

sri()

All stable matchings in the stable roommates problem with incomplete lists

plp()

Partitioning Linear Programme for the stable roommates problem

rsd()

Random serial dictatorship mechanism

ttc()

ttcc()

Estimators

Structural estimators for one- and two-sided matching markets.

stabit()

Matching model and selection correction for group formation

stabit2()

Matching model and selection correction for college admissions

predict(<stabit2>)

Predict method for fitted matching models

khb()

Karlson-Holm-Breen method for comparing probit coefficients

mce()

MC Experiments

Data generation

Functions to produce simulated data for one-sided and two-sided matching markets.

stabsim()

Simulated data for group formation problem

stabsim2()

Simulated data for college admissions problem

Datasets

Description of three datasets for matching markets contained in the package.

baac00

Townsend Thai Project BAAC Annual Resurvey, 2000

klein15a

MCMC results in Klein (2015a)

klein15b

Results of Monte Carlo Simulations in Klein (2015b)